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A-03-000789

IN THE NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT

SPEAR T RANCH, INC.,

APPELLANT,

v.
MELVIN G. KNAUB, et al.,

APPELLEES

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF MORRILL COUNTY, NEBRASKA
The Honorable Paul D. Empson, District Judge

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE

THE CENTRAL NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER AND IRRIGATION DISTRICT

Michael C. Klein, #15428
Anderson, Klein, Swan & Brewster
417 East Avenue, P.O. Box 133
Holdrege, NE 68949-0133
Phone (308) 995-4458
Attorneys for:
The Central Nebraska Public Power and Irrigation District

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Authorities
Introduction
1. The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
2. Primary jurisdiction in light of the Ground Water Management and Protection Act and the recent adoption of LB 962
3. The effect, if any, of the adoption of LB 962 on this appeal
4. Whether the ground water management and protection act or LB 962 have abrogated any common law remedies that the appellant might have, or provide an adequate remedy at law

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Bamford v. Upper Republican Natural Resources District, 245 Neb. 299, 512 N.W.2d 642 (1994)
Dennis v. Kickapoo Land Co., 771 S.W.2d 235 (Texas Ct. Civ. Apps. 1989)
Houston & Texas Cent. R.R. v. East, 98 Tex. 146, 81 S.W. 279 (1904)
Humphrey Feed & Grain, Inc. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 199 Neb. 189, 257 N.W.2d 391 (1977)
In re Big Horn River System, 85 P.3d 981 (Wyo. 2003)
In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River System and Source, 201 Ariz. 307, 35 P.3d 68 (2001)
In re Interest of Battiato, 259 Neb. 829, 613 N.W.2d 12 (2000)
Maricopa County Muni. Water Conserv. Dist. No. One v. Southwest Cotton Co., 39 Ariz. 65, 4 P.2d 369 (1931)
Olson v. City of Wahoo, 124 Neb. 802, 248 N.W. 304 (1933)
State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc., 130 Idaho 727, 947 P.2d 400 (1997)
Wasserburger v. Coffee, 180 Neb. 149, 141 N.W.2d 738 (1966)
Yeo v. Tweedy, 34 N.M. 611, 286 P. 970 (1929)

STATUTES

Neb. Rev. Stat. §§46-710 (Supp. 2004)
Neb. Rev. Stat. §46-713 (Supp. 2004)
Neb. Rev. Stat. §46-714 (Supp. 2004)
Neb. Rev. Stat. §46-715 (Supp. 2004)
Neb. Rev. Stat. §46-740 (Supp. 2004) (formerly §46-656.26)
Neb. Rev. Stat. §§46-656.50 to 46-656.51 7

OTHER

Drain, Streamflow Declines Caused by Groundwater Development in Pumpkin Creek Basin, in Ground Water/Surface Water Interactions, American Water Resources Association (2002)
Glennon and Maddock, The Concept of Capture: The Hydrology and Law of Stream/Aquifer Interactions, 43 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. (1997)
Nebraska Department of Natural Resources, 54th Biennial Report, 2001-2002
Stephen D. Mossman, Whiskey is for Drinkin' But Water is for Fightin' About: A First-Hand Account of Nebraska's Integrated Management of Ground and Surface Water Debate and the Passage of LB108, 30 Creighton L. Rev. 67 (1996)
Tangborn, Hydrologic Changes in North Platte River Subbasin Between Stateline and Lewellen Gages (1953-95), Hymet Company, 1996

Introduction

Article XV, section 6 of the Nebraska Constitution provides that priority of appropriation determines the right to use streamflow in time of shortage. Tributary ground water is part of streamflow. One may choose to ignore reality; other courts adhere to fanciful notions of "underground streams" and "subflow". See, e.g., Maricopa County Muni. Water Conserv. Dist. No. One v. Southwest Cotton Co., 39 Ariz. 65, 4 P.2d 369 (1931); Yeo v. Tweedy, 34 N.M. 611, 286 P. 970 (1929). Some even refuse to acknowledge that streams and ground water are in hydrologic connection. Texas, for example, continues to follow the law of the biggest pump. Dennis v. Kickapoo Land Co., 771 S.W.2d 235 (Texas Ct. Civ. Apps. 1989). As a result, the public resource in Texas has been depleted to the point of uselessness. See, Glennon and Maddock, The Concept of Capture: The Hydrology and Law of Stream/Aquifer Interactions, 43 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. (1997).

Once the reality of the hydrologic connection is recognized, however, the protection of the constitutional mandate is inescapable. A function of this court, perhaps it's most important function, is to protect the rights the people of Nebraska have chosen to enshrine in our constitution. To ignore the constitutional protection afforded appropriators is to permit the actions of individuals to destroy the public's investment in irrigation storage and delivery systems; the effect is to create a private right of condemnation, not condemnation of individual uses of water, but of the public's use. Lake McConaughy is at its lowest level, ever. Depletion of the flow of Pumpkin Creek by unregulated ground water withdrawals has contributed to this condition. See, Drain, Streamflow Declines Caused by Groundwater Development in Pumpkin Creek Basin, in Ground Water/Surface Water Interactions, American Water Resources Association (2002); Tangborn, Hydrologic Changes in North Platte River Subbasin Between Stateline and Lewellen Gages (1953-95), Hymet Company, 1996.

1. The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

Humphrey Feed and Grain, Inc. sued the Union Pacific Railroad for the loss of $21,677.36 worth of grain. The claim was based on the federal law in effect at the time, a statute enacted by Congress to provide national uniformity with respect to claims against common carriers. "Union Pacific's liability for losses is governed by Title 49 U.S.C.A., §20, par. (11) known as the Carmack Amendment, which imposes liability of a carrier for the full actual loss, damage or injury to property of the shipper. With the enactment of the Carmack Amendment, Congress superceded diverse state laws with a national uniform policy governing interstate carriers' liability for property loss, and the federal law governs liability for loss or damage." Humphrey Feed & Grain, Inc. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 199 Neb. 189, 257 N.W.2d 391 (1977). The Court discussed the basic principles of primary jurisdiction: "The effect of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to preclude resort to the courts in the first instance, or to preclude the court from supplying a remedy, or passing upon particular issues until the issues have been passed upon by the administrative agency." Id., 199 Neb. at 207, 257 N.W.2d at 401. In the Humphrey case, the court concluded that the elevator's claim for lost profits should not have been considered by the district court, and that the court should have deferred jurisdiction to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

In the present case, there is no recognition in current Nebraska case law of a common law cause of action on the part of an appropriator against a ground water user; recognition of the constitutional basis for that cause of action is what's at issue here. Also, there is no legislative remedy provided to the appropriator. At least, no remedy which recognizes the constitutional protection of appropriations. In the Humphrey case, there were both. The common law, the Nebraska statutory scheme, and federal law all provided remedies to the elevator. The court concluded, because of the nature of the dispute, that the technical expertise of the regulatory agency provided the better forum for resolution of the issue; for uniformity, and the other policy reasons described by the court.

In contrast to the Carmack Amendment, which specifically provided that the shipper could recover " . . . the full actual loss, damage, or injury to property of the shipper. . ." Id., 199 Neb. at 197, 257 N.W.3d at 397, the Nebraska Groundwater Management and Protection Act (the Act) declines to provide a remedy to the appropriator based on the constitutional mandate. This Court has reaffirmed the basic tenants of primary jurisdiction subsequent to the Humphrey case. In In re Interest of Battiato, 259 Neb. 829, 613 N.W.2d 12 (2000) the issue was whether the doctrine of primary jurisdiction required the application of federal anti-attachment statutes to prevent the enforcement of a county court order for payment of attorney's fees. The court observed: "The primary jurisdiction doctrine applies whenever enforcement of a claim, originally cognizable in the courts, requires the resolution of issues that have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body in accordance with the purpose of a regulatory scheme." 259 Neb. at 837, 613 N.W. 2d at 18. This Court has not recognized a cause of action in favor of an appropriator against a ground water user. The issue is at yet unaddressed. No claim "originally cognizable in the courts" yet exists in Nebraska. The special competence of an administrative body could be called upon to decide issues of fact in accordance with the regulatory scheme, but only if the regulatory scheme afforded a remedy consistent with the constitution. The regulatory scheme in this case ignores the constitutional mandate, recognizes no cause of action and affords no remedy.

The Battiato court also pointed out: "preliminary resort to the administrative agency is required where the inquiry is essentially one of fact and of discretion in technical matters and when uniformity can be secured only if determination is made by that agency." 259 Neb. at 837, 613 N.W.2d at 18. There is no issue of fact for decision in this case. The district court dismissed the Plaintiff's Complaint in response to the Defendants' Rule 12 motions. The issue here is purely one of law: whether an appropriator has a cause of action against a ground water user who is making an unpermitted diversion of streamflow. This is nearly the same question as one asked from the bench at the initial oral argument of this case.

In light of this, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction simply has no application here. The Battiato court agreed: "The doctrine does not apply where a pure question of law is at issue." 259 Neb. at 837, 613 N.W.2d at 18. The balance of the court's analysis on this issue confirms this reasoning: "The doctrine does not apply in relation to a question which, while properly determinable by an administrative tribunal, does not involve a question of fact, but one of pure law, is determinable apart from the exercise of administrative discretion, and the requisite uniformity of determination is attainable otherwise than by confining determination of the question to the administrative tribunal." 259 Neb. at 838, 613 N. W. 2d at 18 -19. This case presents the "pure" question of law.

2. Primary jurisdiction in light of the Ground Water Management and Protection Act and the recent adoption of LB 962.

The Ground Water Management and Protection Act (the Act) was originally enacted in 1975. As originally structured, it provided a mechanism by which Natural Resources Districts (NRDs) could give effect to the modified correlative rights doctrine adopted by this Court in Olson v. City of Wahoo, 124 Neb. 802, 248 N.W. 304 (1933). NRDs could create ground water management areas, areas in which ground water quantity was insufficient to meet the needs of all users, and implement regulations limiting withdrawals in such a way that all would share in shortages. See, Bamford v. Upper Republican Natural Resources District, 245 Neb. 299, 512 N.W.2d 642 (1994).

The Act was substantially modified by LB 108, enacted in 1995. See, Stephen D. Mossman, Whiskey is for Drinkin' But Water is for Fightin' About: A First-Hand Account of Nebraska's Integrated Management of Ground and Surface Water Debate and the Passage of LB 108, 30 Creighton L. Rev. 67 (1996) (hereinafter Mossman). The legislature has further modified the Act by passage of LB 962, (codified, in part, as Neb. Rev. Stat. §§46-710 et seq. (Supp. 2004)). LB 108 provided, in theory, an ability on the part of NRDs to regulate ground water withdrawals to protect streamflow. Neb. Rev. Stat. §46-740 (Supp. 2004) (formerly §46-656.26), and see Mossman, supra. The authority was vested in the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to regulate ground water withdrawals to protect streamflow if there was a risk of violating an interstate compact, decree or agreement. Neb. Rev. Stat. §§46-656.50 to 46-656.51 (repealed by Laws 2004, LB 962 §119). LB 962 provides a somewhat different mechanism by which ground water withdrawals can be regulated to protect streamflow. The DNR may now designate river basins as either fully appropriated or over-appropriated. Neb. Rev. Stat. §46-713 (Supp. 2004). This ends new well drilling in the effected basin or reach. Id., §46-714. (Although irrelevant, it also prevents 'the issuance of any new appropriations. This is irrelevant because no new direct flow appropriations have been granted in the Pumpkin Creek watershed since 1968 and a moratorium on new appropriations in the Pumpkin Creek watershed has been in effect since 1979. Nebraska Department of Natural Resources, 54th Biennial Report, 2001-2002. (hereinafter 54th Biennial Report))

The DNR then cooperates with the effected NRD or NRDs to create an integrated management plan (IMP). The IMP must, at a minimum, insure compliance with decrees, compacts and agreements. Id., §46-715. The IMPs will be structured in an effort to reduce use sufficiently to reach sustainability, that is, to permit all uses to continue indefinitely.

This is a laudable scheme. The problem, however, is obvious. The legislature completely ignored the constitution. Priority of appropriation determines which uses of streamflow may continue in time of shortage, and while the imagined disconnectedness of surface water and ground water gave courts a simple excuse to ignore impending conflicts for many years in some jurisdictions, see, e.g. Houston & Texas Cent. R.R. v. East, 98 Tex. 146, 81 S.W. 279 (1904), such an ignorant fiction is no longer relevant. The statute simply pays no attention to the constitutional foundation upon which use of the limited resource is allocated in time of shortage.

3. The effect, if any, of the adoption of LB 962 on this appeal.

Pending in the Nebraska Court of Appeals is Case No. A-04-000836, Central Ne. Public Power and Irrigation District v. Irrigation Well Owners. The Central Nebraska Public Power and Irrigation District (Central) complained to the DNR that unpermitted diversions upstream of Central's diversion dam (located just below the confluence of the North and South Platte Rivers east of the city of North Platte) are depleting streamflow in violation of the appropriations Central holds in trust for the farmers who are dependent upon the water rights for irrigating their crops. The Complaint was dismissed by the Director; Central has appealed. There are about 2,200 unpermitted diversions upstream of Central's diversion dam, according to the transcript filed by DNR with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals. In this case, the Plaintiff, Spear T Ranch, has filed suit against 24 upstream ground water users, seeking injunctive relief and damages. Can a district court in Morrill County be expected to resolve a conflict involving 24 defendants? Can a district court in Lincoln County (or Keith, Garden, Morrill or Scotts Bluff County, depending on venue) be expected to resolve a conflict involving 2,200 defendants?

The DNR administers about 8,500 appropriations. 54th Biennial Report. The DNR has maintained continuous adjudication of the appropriations in the entire state. This is a record of performance unparalleled in water right adjudication processes in the western states. See, e.g., In re Big Horn River System, 85 P.3d 981 (Wyo. 2003); In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River System and Source, 201 Ariz. 307, 35 P.3d 68 (2001); State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc., 130 Idaho 727, 947 P.2d 400 (1997).

This court's inquiry concerning the doctrine of primary jurisdiction can be understood to raise the question whether the DNR or NRDs are the appropriate forums for adjudication of the multitude of claims of competing unpermitted diversions that apparently exist. Clearly, the DNR is very experienced in such a complex milieu of geology, hydrology and water law. But deference to the DNR or the NRDs can't happen without an answer to the fundamental question raised by this appeal: whether unpermitted diversions of streamflow may continue unabated, in violation of the constitution. Only this court can answer the "pure" question of law. Primary jurisdiction may later apply in the context of resolution of competing claims; first, the constitutional right of appropriators must be protected.

4. Whether the Ground Water Management and Protection Act or LB 962 have abrogated any common law remedies that the appellant might have, or provide an adequate remedy at law.

Abrogation of common law rights, and concurrent remedies, has occurred in Nebraska water law. See, Wasserburger v. Coffee, 180 Neb. 149, 141 N.W. 2d 738 (1966). However, a legislative abrogation of rights which are protected by a specific constitutional provision is simply not possible. Thus, while the constitution could be amended to provide for some other method of allocating water in time of shortage, the legislature is simply without power to accomplish the task, absent such an amendment.

Dated this 28th day of July, 2004.
Respectfully submitted,
THE CENTRAL NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER
AND IRRIGATION DISTRICT

Anderson, Klein, Swan & Brewster
417 East Avenue, P.O. Box 133
Holdrege, NE 68949-0133
Phone (308) 995-4458
Its Attorneys



The Central Nebraska Public Power and Irrigation District
415 Lincoln Street , P.O. Box 740
Holdrege, Nebraska 68949
Phone 308-995-8601
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(Updated 4/17/08 )

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